#MoonwellCollateralRisk

Moonwell has fallen victim to an $8.7 million exploit. The attacker artificially inflated the price of the illiquid MAMO token, used it as overvalued collateral, and withdrew more liquid assets from the protocol, including cbBTC, USDC, wstETH, and ETH. According to CertiK, the hacker has already consolidated the stolen funds into a single address.

🚨MOONWELL LENDING MARKET EXPLOITED ON BASE! According to @CertiKAlert and @blockaid_, an attacker inflated the price of relatively illiquid MAMO collateral on @MoonwellDeFi and borrowed real assets against it, including cbBTC and USDC. About $8.7M has been moved to a single Ethereum address so far. The protocol has not posted a full official update yet.#PCEToJacksonHole #AIMonetizationBroadens #BTCOptionsExpiryTest

🚨 Moonwell just lost 8.7 million dollars on Base after an attacker found a route into its lending market that never checks the supply cap it relies on.

Moonwell's Aug. 27 MAMO Core Market incident is a reminder that collateral quality depends on exit liquidity, not just an oracle print. Thin MAMO liquidity allowed its price to be inflated and used against cbBTC, USDC and other liquid assets, with estimated losses of about $8.7M. Reducing borrowing caps to 1 wei and limiting new MAMO and WELL supply addresses immediate exposure. The deeper lesson is structural: multi-source pricing is most useful when paired with supply limits and borrowing caps calibrated to executable liquidity. An asset can appear adequately priced while remaining unsafe at collateral scale. Not advice, just analysis. #MoonwellCollateralRisk

🚨 ALERT: @MoonwellDeFi suffers an estimated $8.7M exploit on Base. Attackers manipulated the price of illiquid $MAMO collateral and used the inflated value to borrow real assets, including $cbBTC. Moonwell has restricted borrowing while it investigates.

the moonwell situation is rough. as a founder who has been through an exploit it's devastating. what happened (bankr analysis): An attacker pumped the Chainlink MAMO/USD feed to $0.4313 for a single 30-second round. But the price pump alone only bought ~$3.25M of borrowing power. The real trick: Moonwell's 20M MAMO supply cap only blocks mints. The attacker sent 18.48M MAMO directly into the market contract as a plain ERC-20 transfer, inflating the exchange rate and getting credited ~$55.5M of collateral. Total borrowing power: ~$11.97M. Borrowed: ~$11.03M. Bridged out: $8.7M in DAI, sitting untouched on Ethereum. The hole: 53.59 cbBTC + 585 WETH + 2.34M USDC + 342.7 wstETH in unbacked debt (~$9.14M). Remaining collateral backing it: 7.08 MAMO. Effectively zero. The bad debt is permanent. The attack only stopped because an AERO borrow got rejected for insufficient liquidity — $1,422 of headroom left. Guardians didn't freeze borrow caps until 83 minutes later. This is Moonwell's third oracle-related failure in 11 months ($3.7M Nov 2025, ~$1.78M Feb 2026, now this). And the supply-cap-as-collateral-bound flaw applies to every Compound v2 fork. Suppliers in the drained markets are holding the bag. Unless the attacker returns the DAI, that money is most likely gone.

MOONWELL EXPLOITED FOR ~$8.7M @MoonwellDeFi was exploited on Base, with losses estimated at around $8.7M. WHAT HAPPENED? The attacker manipulated the price of $MAMO, an illiquid collateral asset, artificially inflating its borrowing power. Assets reportedly drained included $cbBTC, $USDC and ETH-related assets. This was primarily a collateral/oracle price-manipulation attack, not a simple "MAMO hack." Moonwell restricted borrowing and supply limits on affected Base markets while investigating. KEY LESSON: Low-liquidity collateral + weak oracle design can create major DeFi risk. Oracle security, liquidity depth and strict collateral caps are critical. #Moonwell #MAMO #CryptoHack

BREAKING: Moonwell suffered an $8.7M exploit on Base